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Bundling is one of the most widely used tactics in marketing to achieve segmented
(Nagle 1984: p. 17) and it assumes a variety of forms, many of which work in
subtle ways (Eppen et al 1991). In brief, bundling is the practice of selling two or more
product line pricing (Tellis 1986) even though the choice of products for a bundle does
not have to be tied to the physical production processes adopted by the seller. For
establishments in order to sell travel packages. Bundling practices are common in
transport, airlines offer their customers a "free" baggage allowance, public transport
and freight transport firms sell pick-up and delivery services along with line haul
service. Despite this, the implications of bundling in a transport context have not been
some of the most basic
intuitions carried over from single product models need not hold in the more
 (Hanson and Martin 1990: p. 163). With this
background, Lan and Kanafani's (1991) paper characterising park-and-shop as a
the Lan and Kanafani article. A particular theme to be explored further is that
prescriptions for park-and-shop pricing policy need to be based on a more realistic
A BUNDLING MODEL APPLIED TO PARK-AND-SHOP
Lan and Kanafani employ a well-known bundling model based on Adams and Yellen
park-and-shop package. An important result is that a monopolist can set profit-
maximising prices for shopping and parking in each market (simple monopoly pricing)
bundling). Provided that the simple monopoly prices themselves are profitable, the
introduction of the discounted bundle can have the effect of increasing profits and
consumer surpluses. However, if the social marginal costs of parking exceed the
 By assuming that consumers' reservation prices for parking and shopping are
account of bundling is easy to follow as far as it goes. In each market, the demand
1 is the maximum
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amount any consumer would pay for shopping, and if C1 is the (constant) marginal
cost for shopping, the profit maximising price, R*1, is qual to (T1 + C1)/2. Once the
monopolist sets prices R*1 and R
*
2 for shopping and parking, respectively, it follows
that the market is divided into four segments: those who decide to shop and not park,
those who park but not shop, those who do both, and those who do neither. When the
discounted bundle is offered, the monopolist loses income from the existing shop-and-
park customers (matched by gains in consumer's surpluses). At the same time, some of
the former non-customers are attracted to buy the park-and-shop package, and the
contribution of this group to net profits depends on the mark-up on the bundle. The
interesting gains for the monopolist arise in the segments where customers previously
purchased one but not the other.
The bundle allows the monopolist to pursue a "cross-selling" strategy because the
effect of the discount falls on the demand for the non-purchased component.
Effectively, the non-purchased component now has a lower "implicit" price and this is
sufficient to increase sales. To generate an equivalent increase in demand without a
bundle, it would have been necessary to reduce the price to all consumers, but any
move away from the simple monopoly price must reduce profits. The bundle allows a
more selective approach to discounting. By calculating changes in surpluses in each of
the market segments, Lan and Kanafani demonstrate that a discount on a bundle can
succeed in increasing profits when an unconditional discount cannot. The outcome is a
set of simple monopoly prices plus an optimally determined discount for the bundle.
GLOBALLY OPTIMAL PRICES
However, Lan and Kanafani have not demonstrated that this solution is globally
optimal. Would it be possible to arrive at an even better combination of prices for the
mixed bundle? Also, there are three options that were not considered either explicitly
or implicitly. In general, if there are N products, then there are 22N-1 ways of
presenting them to the market. Thus, for park-and-shop, there are 8 pricing options,
the three not examined thus far are: selling park-and-shop only (pure bundling), selling
the bundle and shopping, and selling the bundle and parking (the null options have
been evaluated implicitly in comparing prices and marginal costs). The pure bundling
option is particularly interesting in the context of park-and-shop because it is
equivalent to the common practice of providing "free" parking. The intention of this
incentive is to attract customers into a store, the costs of which have to be recovered
from the mark-up on shopping. True, some customers might not avail themselves of
the parking service even though it is free, but they pay the same price for shopping as
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do shop-and-park customers. The bundle must be paid for even if one of its
components is unwanted and remains unused.
If pure bundling is common, does it mean that there are circumstances under which
it is more profitable than mixed bundling and simple monopoly pricing? Though this
question can be pursued more formally, the account here relies on a very simple
version of the model. The assumptions employed by Lan and Kanafani are maintained
with the additional constraint that the two products are treated symmetrically in the
sense that the maximum reservation prices and marginal costs are identical for the two
products. Figure 1 depicts the situation facing a monopolist who has two products,
shopping and parking, each of which has the same (constant) marginal cost (C1 = C2).
Simple monopoly pricing results in the separate prices R*1 and R
*
2 such that:
R
T C
ii i i* , ,=
+
=
2
1 2   for  (1)
Note that simple monopoly prices will never fall below 1/2T1 f r any C1  0, so the analysis
can be confined to the triangular region T1cT2. Also, the bundle price is indicated as
the line through the intersection of the price lines R*1b and 
*
2d, meeting the
horizontal axis at a 450 angle at distance T2 + C2 (= T1 + C1) from the origin. Note
that in the symmetric case the segments ab, bc, cd, de, eg, ag, bf are all equal to the
profit-maximising margin, (M*1 = R
*
1 - C1). Whilst the bundle is priced equal to the
sum of the two profit maximising prices, the bundle has no impacts on consumer
choice or on profits. Suppose, though, that the products are sold only as a bundle at
the price R*b, do profits increase as a result?
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Figure 1
Comparison of Simple Monopoly Prices With Pure Bundling
This question can be resolved by carrying out using Lan and Kanafani's approach in
evaluating the mixed bundling case, essentially carrying out an incremental cost-benefit
analysis. Denoting the reservation prices as W1 and  W2, the effect of a single price is
to segment the market into two groups:
W W Rb1 2+ ³      for those who park and shop
W W Rb1 2+ <      for those who do not park and do not shop
Consumers in area abcd continue to buy the bundle at the same total price, so there is
no change in surpluses here. Consumers in area T1eaR
*
1 stop purchasing "shopping
only", and the loss per customer is equal to the mark-up, M*1. There is an additional
and equal loss of profit from customers who previously purchased parking. Against
this, there are gains from the cross-selling in regions eda and abf, and for each
customer there is an improvement in profits also equal to M*1. Note that the loss of
shopping only customers in area e g is equal to the number of shopping customers
who now buy parking under cross-selling. Since the margins are equal, the residual
losses from a change to pure bundling is equal to the number of customers in the
rectangles T1egR
*
1 and hft2R
*
2 times the mark-up, M
*
1. Given these assumptions,
Hooper Park-and-Shop Discounts and Price Bundling
Institute of Transport Studies 6
pure bundling is less profitable than simple monopoly pricing and, hence, is less
profitable than mixed bundling with a discount.
Recall that pure bundling can be considered as a special case of mixed bundling with
R*b and R1 > T1, R2 > T2. An important implication is that it would not pay the
monopolist to implement a mixed bundling scheme with Rb = R
*
b while R1 > R
*
1
and/or R1 > R
*
2. That is, the monopolist cannot increase profits by introducing a
bundle at price R*b and then selectively increasing the individual prices of parking and
shopping. This does not demonstrate that some other combination of prices can do no
better. Though it is possible to state the profit functions for simple monopoly pricing,
pure bundling and mixed bundling and to derive profit-maximising prices, the analysis
is cumbersome even in the unrealistic symmetric case. This emphasises a fundamental
difficulty in deriving optimal prices for product bundles; whatever distributional
properties are possessed by the reservation prices of the components, it is necessary
also to deal with the less predictable distribution that results when these variables are
added. For example, the rectangular distribution yields linear demand functions for
each of the components on their own, but these properties are not preserved for the
summation of reservation prices; the resulting profit functions for the bundling options
do not appear in convenient forms. Probably as a result of this difficulty, few
contributions on bundling explicitly show how to derive optimal prices and those that
do are heavily constrained (Hanson and Martin 1990). An alternative approach that has
attracted less attention is to commence with an arbitrary set of prices and to adopt a
search procedure that converges on a locally or globally optimal combination (Kinberg
and Sudit 1979).
Nevertheless, it is possible to advance a number of general propositions about the
profitability of bundling and it is not necessary to delve further into the particular
circumstances of the symmetric, bivariate rectangular distribution. By imposing a
bivariate normal distribution, Schmalensee (1984) was able to show (unlike our result
above) that pure bundling can be more profitable than simple monopoly pricing
because it succeeds in reducing buyer diversity, and generally it makes consumers
worse off. In that case, there might be welfare economics arguments against "free"
parking at shopping centres. The greater are reservation prices relative to costs, the
greater the likelihood that pure bundling will be more profitable than simple monopoly
pricing. Since mixed bundling combines the advantages of simple monopoly pricing
and pure bundling, it is not surprising to find that mixed bundling is usually the most
profitable of the three strategies.
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The reason why mixed bundling succeeds is that it allows more efficient extraction
of consumers' surpluses as a form of price discrimination. Those consumers who place
a high value on shopping but not on parking, for example, can be set a high price for
shopping. Likewise, a high price can be set for consumers who value parking highly
but who are not prepared to pay much for shopping. The bundle allows the monopolist
to retain the customers who are more price sensitive, and this form of price
discrimination seems to be "fair" because all customers are offered the same set of
prices. On the surface, it might appear that the success of bundling is based on a
negative correlation in the reservation prices of individual consumers but Schmalensee
(1984) has demonstrated that this is not the case; bundling succeeds because bundling
reduces effective consumer heterogeneity and this can be used to increase profits.
EFFECTS OF BUNDLING ON CONSUMER DEMAND
Returning to the park-and-shop case, we are left with a general presumption in favour
of charging some positive price for parking in combination with a discount for those
customers who both park and shop. If pure bundling ("free" parking) is less profitable
than the mixed bundling alternative, why is it so common? It is possible, of course, that
there are cost conditions that make it unattractive to charge for parking. For example,
if the marginal cost of providing parking is low while the administrative costs of
implementing a pricing scheme are high, it might be easier to extract the costs of
parking through higher margins on shopping. However, let us concentrate on the
effects of bundling on consumer demand. First, we note that both shopping and
parking are supplied in more or less competitive markets, and this raises the question
whether the bundling as price discrimination argument is applicable in this context,
especially since the general view in the literature is that bundling cannot be sustained in
competitive markets. This is because the seller cannot gain surpluses from new
customers or from cross-selling that are needed to outweigh the losses due to
discounting the bundle. In this case it might be expected that increasing degrees of
competition among shopping centres would be correlated with a greater degree of
unbundling of services such as "free" parking. The observation that bundling is popular
in markets with large numbers of buyers and sellers (Eppen et al 1991) often is
explained in terms of complementarities in production and demand.
In the specific example of park-and-shop, there is a strong likelihood of
complementarity in demand, but it is not immediately clear how this modifies the
results. A common presumption is that complementarity enhances the case for
bundling, but apart from Guiltinan (1987) there has been scant attention to the subject.
Of special interest here is a form of complementarity based on search and transaction
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costs. That is, bundle partners can be chosen so that search and transaction costs of
consumers are reduced. In more detail, once a shopper decides to park at a particular
shopping centre, the search and transaction costs incurred in making all purchases at
that centre are "sunk" and there is an incentive to remain "loyal" even if it is known
that there are relatively high mark-ups on some products. By lowering the barrier to
shopping in the form of free parking, the seller is hoping to cross-sell to a larger
market of parkers or to generate new customers (by gaining market share from rival
centres). This is akin to loss leadership in retailing, a form of price discrimination
achieved through bundling (Mulhern and Leone 1991). That is, the role of
complementarity in bundling can be to strengthen market power in one or more
product markets. Though there are many buyers and sellers, a degree of monopoly
power is created through bundling.
It is not a straightforward matter to incorporate complementarity and rivalry into a
simple model of bundling (Matutes and Regibeau 1992), but it would be a useful
extension of Lan and Kanafani to pursue this line of argument to explain park-and-
shop pricing. A more problematic issue is whether consumers respond "rationally" to
bundle prices. The possibility has been raised in the literature on consumer choice that
there can be a "preference reversal" effect when consumers evaluate multi-product
bundles, a single price charged for a bundle of benefits has less of a negative impact on
choice than the sum of a set of individual prices (Goldberg et al 1984, Gaeth et al
1990, Drumwright 1992). The argument is that the incorporation of, say, park-and-
shop charges into a single price increases the demand for the park-and-shop bundle. If
consumers are not indifferent to how the bundle is priced, the determination of optimal
prices for park-and-shop is clearly more difficult.
Another line of argument is that consumers respond more to "reference prices" than
they do to reservation prices. Given the prevalence of discounting, consumers do not
always consider advertised discounts as being genuine, but bundle discounts do appear
to be considered favourably. Moreover, a combination of different types of discounts
can have a greater impact than a single discount (Yadav and Monroe 1993), suggesting
that it might be more advantageous to give a discount on shopping and/or parking and
then to offer an additional saving on park-and-shop.
SUMMARY
To sum up, Lan and Kanafani's derivation of optimal prices is a partial analysis and the
assumptions of their model need to be relaxed to provide a more realistic account of
competition and the role of complementarity in demand. Though their prescription for
prices and their explanation of the motivation for park-and-shop discounts need to be
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treated with caution, the paper does indicate how important it is that the analysis of
pricing decisions be viewed in a multi-product context. The transport sector is rich in
examples of bundling practices and there is an opportunity to extend Lan and
Kanafani's use of the bundling paradigm to shed fresh insights into consumer behaviour
and into the pricing behaviour of transport firms. The arguments cited above indicate
that it is necessary to pursue two lines of investigation: one is to understand the role of
bundling at the aggregate market level; the other is to explore the way consumers
evaluate multi-product bundles.
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